Balancing risks: John F. Kennedy Jr's chain of risk decisions
By: Les Dobson and Dan Keegan
Date: 1999-07-28
John F. Kennedy Jr's single-engine Piper Saratoga plunged into the ocean off Martha's Vineyard after a short flight from Fairfield, NJ on July 16, 1999, killing all on board.
And while there's no evidence that the crash resulted from poor training or decision-making by Kennedy (crashes also result from mechanical failure, fuel problems and other factors) the wave of speculation about the pilot's risk decisions raises some very important questions that are relevant to all crashes, in the air or on the road.
On one level, of course, aviation presents a much more demanding set of problems than those faced by the average automobile driver. The addition of a third dimension, apart from more complicated controls, sees to that. Despite the trepidation of the average person to lift more than one foot off the ground at a time, flying is essentially extremely safe, although very unforgiving if something does go wrong.
Nonetheless, accidents on land, in the air or at sea are rarely caused by a single factor. More frequently, they're the result of a chain of events, misperceptions and psychological factors that, if allowed to develop, can result in a fatal cocktail.
In the accident involving Kennedy, for instance, the speculation has an inexperienced pilot, flying a relatively new machine at night, over water, and in weather conditions suitable only for instrument-rated, experienced pilots. Out of visual contact with references such as the horizon and the ground, he finally loses control.
However, the decisions that led to this situation were not clear cut. The Piper Saratoga took off at about 8.30 p.m., around sunset. Conditions at that time were visual flight rules (VFR) and very manageable.
In a recent Larry King Live show on CNN, King asked his panel of highly experienced pilots what decision they would likely have made if they had the same experience level as Kennedy and were presented with the same conditions. Most, including retired U.S. Air force fighter pilot Captain Scott O'Grady, lawyer and Korean war veteran pilot F. Lee Bailey, and Olympic gold medallist Bruce Jenner, said they probably would have taken off.
While the general consensus amongst Larry King's panel was that Kennedy had become disoriented in a situation that required instrument flying, there was by no means consensus that reckless decision making had led to this. In fact, assuming that the speculation about what happened is correct, it may have been a gradual "spiral dive" of minor risk decisions that led to the final spiral dive of the aircraft.
The Social risk factor
Virtually ignored amidst all the post-crash analysis is a factor that quite possibly played a key role in this spiral of risk. It's a very important factor in all kinds of accident situations and increasingly recognized by safety experts as an important factor in risk decisions. Sociologists call it "social risk".
In his 1993 book, Beyond Traffic Safety, researcher J. Peter Rothe explains how social risk often outweighs the traffic risks in the world of driving. "Risks for good reasons are normal" he writes. A mother who is taking her turn picking up kids to take to a hockey game, for example, may normally be strict about the use of seatbelts. But if it happens there's one extra kid for whom the car has no seatbelt, is it reasonable to leave that kid behind?
Hardly! The certain social consequences (disappointed kid, annoyed coach, upset parents) are much more real and immediate than the remote chance of being in a collision on that particular drive. An even more telling example recounted by Rothe is the teenager who drinks at a party. He should call home and have his parents pick him up rather than drive. He's even signed a contract with his parents that if he does make such a call they will pick him up, no questions asked. But the reality , says Rothe, is that teens know there will be consequences despite the contract.
"Despite parental assurance, most parents who answered student calls did engage in judgment or discipline." And students were worried about what parents would think if they knew there was drinking at parties. "To call parents for rides was considered by most to be unthinkable".
Just about every driver will recollect situations in which the social risk of getting a traffic ticket or having a crash was much less feared than the risk of being late, or failing to provide transportation for friends, or of appearing overcautious and timid in the presence of peers, outweighed normal caution in driving.
In John Kennedy Jr's case, and here again we enter the realm of pure speculation, he may have felt under some pressure to make the flight so that he could drop off his sister-in-law at Martha's Vineyard and continue to Hyannis Port for his cousin Rory's wedding in Nantucket the next day. News reports say Kennedy intended to make a daytime flight, but was delayed when his sister-in-law couldn't leave work early enough and he hit heavy traffic coming out of New York.
Known in aviation circles as "get-there-itis", the urge to make a flight despite potential pitfalls is one of the most frequent contributors to accidents. The pressures of business and personal commitments can have a powerful effect on pilots. This is particularly true in private aviation where pilots frequently have less flying experience than their airline counterparts and are also in charge of aircraft that cannot fly above adverse weather conditions.
Car drivers frequently face similar, albeit lesser, trip commitment problems. A novice driver may lack the experience to negotiate a busy expressway, for instance, but may try it anyway because of peer pressure. A driver may set out, hoping for the best, in heavy snow or black ice conditions because of a social arrangement.
The "get-there-itis" syndrome is particularly deadly if combined with alcohol (there's absolutely no suggestion, of course, that alcohol was involved in the Kennedy plane crash). Rather than leaving the keys with a friend and taking a taxi home, many a driver whose perceptions have been clouded by alcohol, and who was confident he or she could get home safely, has ended up in the graveyard instead.
The social risk factor often overrides the caution that safety advocates promote in relation to speed, seatbelts, weather, or even mechanical fitness. Awareness of its presence and influence is probably the best defense.
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